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SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 Defense Distributed, the Second Amendment 
Foundation (“SAF”), and other firearm interest organizations, 
together with one of their members (“Plaintiffs”), challenge the 
New Jersey Attorney General’s efforts to prevent unregistered 
and unlicensed persons from distributing computer programs 
that can be used to make firearms with a three-dimensional 
(“3D”) printer.1  When Plaintiffs sued in the United States 
District Court for the District of New Jersey, the same claims 
by some of the same plaintiffs were already pending in the 
United States District Court for the Western District of Texas 
(“the Texas action”).  Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary 
injunction in New Jersey, but the District Court stayed the 
proceedings until the Texas action was resolved and dismissed 
the injunction motion.  Plaintiffs appeal the District Court’s 
 
1 In addition to Defense Distributed, an organization 
that publishes gun production computer files on the Internet, 
and SAF, whose members allegedly “seek to republish Defense 
Distributed’s files,” App. 10-11, Plaintiffs are the Firearms 
Policy Coalition, Inc., Firearms Policy Foundation, The 
Calguns Foundation, and California Association of Federal 
Firearms Licensees, Inc., which are organizations that maintain 
CodeIsFreeSpeech.com, a website that republishes Defense 
Distributed’s files, and Brandon Combs, the creator of 




orders, asking us to direct that Court to decide the motion for a 
preliminary injunction.  Because the District Court’s stay and 





Attorneys general from several states, including New 
Jersey, have initiated civil and criminal enforcement actions to 
prevent Defense Distributed from publishing computer files on 
the Internet that can make guns using a 3D printer.  Def. 
Distrib. v. Grewal (Def. Distrib. II), 364 F. Supp. 3d 681, 686 
(W.D. Tex. 2019) (explaining history), argued, No. 19-50723 
(5th Cir. May 4, 2020).  In response, in July 2018, Defense 
Distributed and SAF filed a complaint, alleging that actions by 
state attorneys general were a “coordinated and politically-
fueled campaign to censor Defense Distributed” that violated 
various constitutional rights.  Id. at 686.  The Texas plaintiffs 
moved for a preliminary injunction, and the state attorneys 
general moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.  Id. 
at 685.  On January 30, 2019, the Texas court granted the 
motions to dismiss and accordingly denied the motion for a 
preliminary injunction.  Id. at 693.2 
 
2 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has 
determined that personal jurisdiction exists and remanded for 
further proceedings.  Defense Distributed v. Grewal, No. 19-
50723 (5th Cir. Aug. 19, 2020).  
  
    Besides this action and the Texas action, Defense 
Distributed and SAF have been involved in three related cases.  
First, Defense Distributed and SAF challenged federal 
regulations requiring prior authorization to publish their files, 
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 Six days later, Plaintiffs here filed this lawsuit.  Like in 
the Texas action, Plaintiffs alleged that “[w]ith a torrent of civil 
and criminal enforcement actions, [the Attorney General] is 
conducting a censorship campaign.”  App. 8.  Proceeding 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiffs allege that the Attorney 
General’s actions violate their rights under the First and 
Second Amendments, the Equal Protection and Due Process 
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the dormant 
Commerce Clause, and that the Attorney General’s actions are 
preempted by the federal Arms Export Control Act and 
Communications Decency Act.   
 
but their motion for a preliminary injunction failed.  Defense 
Distrib. v. U.S. Dep’t of State (Def. Distrib. I), 121 F. Supp. 3d 
680, 696, 701 (W.D. Tex. 2015), aff’d, 838 F.3d 451, 460 (5th 
Cir. 2016).  Defense Distributed, SAF, and the State 
Department settled and agreed that the State Department would 
modify the federal regulations (by an immediate, temporary 
modification of the regulations and a final rule).  Def. Distrib. 
II, 364 F. Supp. 3d at 685-86.  These regulations, however, 
have been preliminarily enjoined, and the temporary 
modification was vacated.  Washington v. U.S. Dep’t of State 
(Washington I), 420 F. Supp. 3d 1130, 1148 (W.D. Wash. 
2019), appeal dismissed, No. 20-35064 (9th Cir. July 21, 
2020).  Just before Washington I reached final judgment, the 
State Department published its final rule, and state attorneys 
general challenged the rule in Washington v. U.S. Department 
of State (Washington II), --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2:20-cv-00111-
RAJ, 2020 WL 1083720, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 6, 2020).  
The court preliminarily enjoined the State Department from 
implementing or enforcing the final rule.  Id. at *11.  Thus, 





Two weeks later, Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary 
injunction on all claims except their Second Amendment and 
Equal Protection claims.  Meanwhile in the Texas action, 
Defense Distributed and SAF moved to amend the district 
court’s judgment, arguing that (1) the court erred in its 
jurisdictional analysis and should “withdraw[] the decision to 
dismiss the Plaintiffs’ action as to all defendants,” and (2) they 
should be allowed to amend their complaint to include 
allegations that would support personal jurisdiction over the 
Attorney General specifically.  Pls.’ Mot. to Alter or Amend 
the J., Def. Distrib. II, No. 1:18-CV-637 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 27, 
2019), ECF No. 102.  Because Defense Distributed and SAF 
continued the litigation in the Texas action, the Attorney 
General requested a stay of the New Jersey proceedings.     
 
 At a March 7, 2019 conference on the stay request, the 
Attorney General explained that he was prepared to defend this 
action in the District of New Jersey, but that because Defense 
Distributed and SAF are pursuing the Texas action, the 
Attorney General is required to only defend in the first-filed 
Texas action.  In response, Plaintiffs argued that a stay was not 
proper because the New Jersey action had five additional 
plaintiffs, so the Texas action should not delay their right to 
relief.  The Court explained that the requested stay “require[s] 
us to exercise patience until Judge Pitman [the presiding judge 
in the Texas action] has ruled on [Defense Distributed and 
SAF’s] motion.  That’s all.”  App. 999.   
 
At the end of the conference, the District Court 
announced that it would stay the case.  The Court explained 
that “it’s just a rule of the courts that you don’t proceed in two 
courts at the same time, same parties, same issue.”  App. 1005.  
7 
 
The Court then issued an order providing that “all proceedings 
in this action are STAYED until the action in the Western 
District of Texas . . . is resolved and no other motions for relief 
and/or appeals are viable.”  App. 4.  Plaintiffs appealed that 
order.     
 
 Activity in New Jersey then paused, but activity in 
Texas continued.  The Texas court denied Defense Distributed 
and SAF’s motion to amend the judgment, Order, Def. Distrib. 
II, No. 1:18-CV-637 (W.D. Tex. July 1, 2019), ECF No. 109, 
and they appealed the order dismissing their complaint for lack 
of jurisdiction, Notice of Appeal, Def. Distrib. II, No. 1:18-
CV-637 (W.D. Tex. July 31, 2019), ECF No. 110; Brief of 
Appellants, Def. Distrib. v. Grewal, No. 19-50723 (5th Cir. 
Nov. 22, 2019), but did not request an injunction pending 
appeal from the Court of Appeals.   
  
With the Texas action continuing, the District Court 
issued an order that provided: 
 
IT APPEARING that on March 7, 2019, the 
Court ordered that all proceedings in this action 
are stayed until the related action in the Western 
District of Texas . . . is resolved and no other 
motions for relief and/or appeals are viable . . . , 
ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Amended Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction . . . is DISMISSED 
without prejudice.  Plaintiffs may refile this 
Motion once the stay has been lifted in this 
action.   




In their consolidated appeal, Plaintiffs ask us to (1) hold 
that the District Court erred in staying the case and (2) direct 
the Court to decide their motion for a preliminary injunction.     
II 
 
 We must determine whether we have appellate 
jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ appeal.3  Since Congress first 
organized the federal judiciary in 1789, only final decisions of 
district courts have been appealable, subject to limited 
exceptions.  Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2319 (2018).  
Plaintiffs rely on the exception in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), 
which grants appellate courts jurisdiction over “[i]nterlocutory 
orders of the district courts of the United 
States . . . refusing . . . injunctions.”  Our jurisdiction under 
§ 1292(a)(1) extends to the review of orders expressly denying 
injunctions and “orders that have the practical effect 
of . . . denying injunctions.”  Rolo v. Gen. Dev. Corp., 949 
F.2d 695, 702 (3d Cir. 1991) (emphasis omitted) (quoting 
Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 
271, 287-88 (1988)).  Section 1292(a)(1)’s exception to the 
final-decision rule is limited, so we construe § 1292(a)(1) 
narrowly.  Ross v. Zavarella, 916 F.2d 898, 902 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 
 The District Court did not expressly deny Plaintiffs’ 
motion for a preliminary injunction, so we apply the test from 
Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 83 (1981), to 
determine whether the stay is a practical denial of an 
injunction.  See OFC Comm Baseball v. Markell, 579 F.3d 
 
3 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331.  “Our authority to determine the extent of our own 
jurisdiction is plenary.”  Papotto v. Hartford Life & Accident 
Ins. Co., 731 F.3d 265, 269 (3d Cir. 2013). 
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293, 298 (3d Cir. 2009).  If we conclude that the order has the 
“practical effect of refusing an injunction,” then we determine 
whether the appellants have shown that the order has “serious, 
perhaps irreparable, consequence[s]” and “can be effectually 
challenged only by immediate appeal.”  Gillette v. Prosper, 858 
F.3d 833, 840 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Carson, 450 U.S. at 84). 
     
A 
 
 The orders here do not have the “practical effect of 
refusing an injunction.”  Gillette, 858 F.3d at 840.  “[A]n order 
staying . . . an action for equitable relief does not fall under 
section 1292(a)(1), even though it postpones . . . resolution of 
an action seeking injunctive relief.”  Cohen v. Bd. of Trs., 867 
F.2d 1455, 1464 (3d Cir. 1989) (en banc); see also Gulfstream, 
485 U.S. at 279 (explaining that an “order by a federal court 
that relates only to the conduct or progress of litigation before 
that court ordinarily . . . is not appealable under § 1292(a)(1)”).  
The stay order here fits squarely into what our Court described 
in Cohen as a non-appealable stay order: the District Court 
simply “postpone[d] . . . resolution of an action seeking 
injunctive relief,” 867 F.2d at 1464, until Plaintiffs finished 
their litigation in Texas.4   
 
Moreover, the District Court explained that it stayed 
consideration of Plaintiffs’ motion because of an earlier filed 
 
4 We do not announce today a categorical rule that stays 
are never appealable.  Rather, we recognize that the stay here 
addresses only the conduct of litigation and simply 
“postpones . . . resolution of an action seeking injunctive 
relief,” so it does not have the practical effect of denying an 
injunction on the merits.  Cohen, 867 F.2d at 1464. 
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case.  See generally Chavez v. Dole Food Co., Inc., 836 F.3d 
205, 210 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc) (instructing that “when 
duplicative lawsuits are filed successively in two different 
federal courts, the court where the action was filed first has 
priority,” so the second-filed court should stay the case).  
Indeed, we have held that stay orders were not appealable in 
similar procedural postures.  For example, in Cotler v. Inter-
County Orthopaedic Ass’n, P.A., we held that a stay of 
proceedings (wherein a plaintiff requested an injunction) 
pending related, though not identical, state court proceedings 
was not a practical denial of an injunction because “we have 
held that the stay by the district court of its own action pending 
conclusion of a proceeding before” another tribunal is “only a 
regulation of the course of the action itself.”  526 F.2d 537, 
540-41 (3d Cir. 1975) (collecting cases).5  Thus, pursuant to 
the well-established rule that stays are not practical denials of 
an injunction, the District Court’s order staying the case 
pending the Texas action is not a practical denial of Plaintiffs’ 
request for a preliminary injunction. 
 
The District Court’s order “dismiss[ing]” the motion for 
a preliminary injunction also does not qualify as a denial of an 
injunction.  App. 4 (capitalization omitted).  While the Court 
used the word “dismiss,” a fair reading of the order and the 
record indicates that the Court was simply removing from its 
docket a motion that would not be acted on soon.  See Hoots v. 
Pennsylvania, 639 F.2d 972, 979 (3d Cir. 1981) (instructing 
 
5 Accord Spring City Corp. v. Am. Bldgs. Co., 193 F.3d 
165, 171 (3d Cir. 1999) (“If the stay simply defers or postpones 
resolution of an action in federal court, then it is only a 




that “[w]e must look beyond the text of the order” to determine 
its appealability).  By dismissing the motion without prejudice, 
the Court clearly conveyed that its order was not the final word 
on the request.  See Weber v. McGrogan, 939 F.3d 232, 242 
(3d Cir. 2019) (explaining that a dismissal of a complaint 
without prejudice leaves “a live action still pending before the 
District Court”); Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Scottsdale 
Ins. Co., 316 F.3d 431, 438-40 (3d Cir. 2003) (explaining that 
appellate courts generally lack jurisdiction over issues that 
have been dismissed without prejudice).  Further, an order that 
dismisses a motion on procedural grounds does not “pass on 
the legal sufficiency of any claims for injunctive relief.”  
Shirey v. Bensalem Township, 663 F.2d 472, 477 (3d Cir. 
1981) (quoting Gardner v. Westinghouse Broad. Co., 437 U.S. 
478, 481 (1978)); Hershey Foods Corp. v. Hershey Creamery 
Co., 945 F.2d 1272, 1279 (3d Cir. 1991) (“Orders that . . . do 
not grant or deny part of the substantive relief sought by the 
claimant are not immediately appealable under section 
1292(a)(1).”).  Here, the Court removed the motion from its 
docket pending the stay, made clear it did so without prejudice, 
and thus did not substantively deny the request for an 
injunction or dismiss the claims on which it is based.  See 
Hershey, 945 F.2d at 1279; Shirey, 663 F.2d at 477.  Because 
12 
 
there has been no ruling, explicitly or effectively, denying the 
injunction,6 the appeal must be dismissed.7 
 
6 The two cases on which Plaintiffs rely to argue that the 
stay had the practical effect of denying an injunction are 
distinguishable.  First, Rolo v. General Development Corp. 
involves a situation where the plaintiff would sustain an 
indisputable irreparable harm without immediate intervention.  
There, the district court stayed a class action pending 
resolution of bankruptcy and criminal proceedings involving 
the defendants.  949 F.2d at 698-99.  The plaintiffs produced 
evidence that the companies were liquidating and distributing 
their assets and sought an injunction to stop this activity.  Id. at 
703.  The district court stayed consideration of the motion.  Id. 
at 699.  On appeal, we observed that by deferring consideration 
of the injunction, the court effectively allowed the companies 
to dissipate the assets.  As a result, any later, renewed motion 
could not achieve the relief plaintiffs sought (protecting the 
assets) because the assets would be gone.  See id. at 703-04.  
For these reasons, we held that “the district court’s refusal to 
consider the application for a preliminary injunction 
effectively denied them the ultimate relief that they seek.”  Id. 
at 703 n.5.   
 The stay here does not have the same effect.  Plaintiffs 
can still achieve the “ultimate relief they seek” (enjoining the 
Attorney General’s enforcement efforts) with a renewed 
motion.  Rolo presented a now-or-never scenario: given the 
activities for which the relief was sought, delaying relief meant 
no relief would be available.  Here, by contrast, the relief 
requested by Plaintiffs is available later.  While Plaintiffs argue 
that the stay allows the Attorney General to violate their rights 
“in the meantime” and such rights “can never be untrampled,” 




postponing a decision on Plaintiffs’ injunction does not cause 
them any harm. 
 
 The second case on which Plaintiffs rely is similarly 
unhelpful.  In Victaulic Co. v. Tieman, a company filed 
contract and tort claims against a former employee and his new 
employer for allegedly violating a non-compete agreement.  
499 F.3d 227, 231 (3d Cir. 2007).  The company moved for a 
preliminary injunction while the employee and new employer 
moved to dismiss.  Id.  The district court dismissed the claims 
relating to the agreement but left one non-contract claim 
pending.  Id.  The company appealed the dismissal, arguing 
that dismissal effectively denied the company’s request for a 
preliminary injunction.  Id.  We explained that “the District 
Court has effectively denied the relief that is at the heart of [the 
company’s] claims,”  Id. at 234, because its dismissal of claims 
on the merits on which the injunction was sought left no ground 
for any injunctive relief.  See Cohen, 867 F.2d at 1464. 
 
 Unlike Victaulic where the district court dismissed 
claims, with prejudice and on the merits, the District Court here 
only postponed consideration of a motion and has not opined 
on the merits of any of Plaintiffs’ claims.  As a result, its stay 
does nothing “to limit the [availability] of injunctive relief . . . 
under the facts pled.”  Victaulic, 499 F.3d at 234.  Thus, the 
precedent on which Plaintiffs rely to support departure from 
the rule that stays are not practical denials of an injunction is 
distinguishable. 
 
7 Our precedent forecloses the argument that a stay here 
puts the Plaintiffs that are not plaintiffs in the Texas action “out 





 Although the failure to satisfy the first Carson prong 
requires dismissal, Victaulic, 499 F.3d at 232, Plaintiffs cannot 
satisfy the other two prongs either.  On the second, the stay 
does not impose “serious, perhaps irreparable 
consequence[s].”  Carson, 450 U.S. at 84.  Orders like those 
here based on a district court’s “discretionary power over the 
scope of the action” and that “relat[e] primarily to convenience 
in litigation” do not carry a serious risk of irreparable harm 
because they do not affect the merits of an appellant’s claims.  
Gardner, 437 U.S. at 480-81 & n.7 (citation omitted).  
Nonetheless, Plaintiffs assert that absent quick action on their 
motion for a preliminary injunction, their First Amendment 
rights are violated by the Attorney General’s “censorship.”  
Appellants’ Supp. Br. at 4.  This assertion does not change the 
result. 
 
 First, we consider how urgently a party has pursued 
their claims, Victaulic, 499 F.3d at 232, and the appellant’s 
“conduct and litigating positions,” Huminski v. Rutland City 
 
F.2d at 540-41 (applying the usual rule that stays are not a 
practical denial of an injunction—even though the parties, 
allegations, and causes of action in the related proceeding were 
“not identical”).  Moreover, since the CodeIsFreeSpeech.com 
plaintiffs seek to “receiv[e] and republish[] Defense 
Distributed’s files,” App. 49, in the Texas action, any 
injunctive relief the Texas court grants to Defense Distributed 
may provide the CodeIsFreeSpeech.com plaintiffs the relief 
they seek in the District Court here.  Accordingly, while they 
are not present in the Texas action, their claims effectively are 
being pursued, so a stay here does not put them out of court. 
15 
 
Police Dep’t, 221 F.3d 357, 360 (2d Cir. 2000) (per curiam) 
(quoting Cuomo v. Barr, 7 F.3d 17, 19 (2d Cir. 1993)); accord 
United States v. Wade, 713 F.2d 49, 53 (3d Cir. 1983).  The 
Attorney General made clear that he would defend against 
Plaintiffs’ claims in New Jersey—but not in two forums.  If the 
Attorney General’s actions harmed Plaintiffs and they needed 
immediate relief, they could have withdrawn their action in 
Texas and pursued the New Jersey action.  They did not.  
Further, they chose to prolong litigation in Texas over personal 
jurisdiction, but even if they succeed in their appeal, it will not 
result in an injunction.8  Plaintiffs had a path to get the District 
Court here to decide the merits of their injunction request but 
did not take it.  See Huminski, 221 F.2d at 361 (concluding that 
the appellant had not shown serious consequences because he 
failed to use multiple available procedural mechanisms to 
speed along resolution of his case).  Plaintiffs’ litigation 
strategy thus represents “a strong indication that the status quo 
can continue” and belies an assertion of irreparable harm.  
Wade, 713 F.2d at 53.   
 
Second, even if we entertained the appeal, directed the 
District Court to consider the injunction motion, and the Court 
enjoined the Attorney General from “censoring” Plaintiffs, the 
federal government and several state attorneys general are still 
preventing the dissemination of the files.  The temporary 
modification of federal regulations permitting Defense 
 
8 Defense Distributed and SAF did not move for an 
injunction pending appeal in the Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit, nor did they seek expedited review.  A failure to move 
for a preliminary injunction or expedite an appeal indicates that 
the underlying harm complained of is not serious.  Huminski, 
221 F.3d at 361. 
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Distributed to disseminate their files is currently vacated, 
Washington v. U.S. Dep’t of State (Washington I), 420 F. 
Supp. 3d 1130, 1148 (W.D. Wash. 2019), appeal dismissed, 
No. 20-35064 (9th Cir. July 21, 2020), and the federal 
government is enjoined from enforcing the final rule, 
Washington v. U.S. Dep’t of State (Washington II), --- F. Supp. 
3d ----, 2:20-cv-00111-RAJ, 2020 WL 1083720, at *11 (W.D. 
Wash. Mar. 6, 2020).  That means that under federal law, 
Defense Distributed cannot disseminate its files.  Washington 
II, 2020 WL 1083720, at *11 (providing that the injunction 
maintains the “status quo” on restrictions on 3D gun files).9  
Additionally, in the Texas action, Defense Distributed and 
SAF allege that actions from multiple state attorneys general—
not just New Jersey’s—“censor Defense Distributed.”  Def. 
Distrib. II, 354 F. Supp. 3d at 686 (quoting amended 
complaint).  Thus, a stay that delays consideration of a request 
for injunctive relief is of no consequence because, even if the 
District Court considered and granted such an injunction, that 
injunction would not alleviate the alleged censorship.   
 
 At bottom, we only allow appeals via § 1292(a)(1) 
when the injury “outweighs Congress’ stated policy against 
piecemeal review.”  Ross, 916 F.2d at 902.  Because Plaintiffs’ 
conduct belies any assertion of injury, they cannot show why 
we should bring the stay here into the narrow class of orders 
appealable under § 1292(a)(1).  See N.J. State Nurses Ass’n v. 
Treacy, 834 F.2d 67, 70-71 (3d Cir. 1987) (“[W]e must 
approach this statute somewhat gingerly lest a floodgate be 
opened that brings into the exception many pretrial orders.” 
 
9 Indeed, Plaintiffs’ complaint made plain that Defense 
Distributed stopped disseminating its files due to injunctive 
orders from the Washington I court.   
17 
 





 Finally, assuming the first two Carson prongs were met, 
Plaintiffs must still demonstrate that an “immediate appeal [is] 
the only means of effective[ly] challeng[ing]” the orders.  
Victaulic, 499 F.3d at 232.  “The ‘effective challenge’ prong 
deals with whether the appellant can get substantially similar 
relief without an immediate appeal.”  Id.  Put differently, we 
ask whether an immediate appeal is necessary for the appellant 
to obtain effective review of the order and have its appellate 
rights vindicated.  See Carson, 450 U.S. at 88 n.14 (prong 
satisfied where review of the order would be compromised if 
review delayed until final judgment); Victaulic, 499 F.3d at 
233 (prong satisfied because the district court’s dismissal of 
claims “left [the appellant] with no means of receiving 
preliminary relief” as the court resolved all the issues relating 
to such relief); Metex Corp. v. ACS Indus., Inc., 748 F.2d 150, 
154 (3d Cir. 1984) (prong not satisfied because “dismissal of 
this appeal would not preclude an effective appeal if one is 
considered necessary at a later date: the issues regarding 
appellant’s . . . claim will not be obscured, and perhaps will be 
better illuminated, by the passage of time”); RMI, 661 F.2d at 
282 (same).  
 
 Here, even if we held that the District Court’s order 
constituted the denial of an injunction, an immediate appeal is 
not necessary to challenge the Court’s ruling.  An appeal is not 
the “only means of effective[ly] challeng[ing]” the orders, 
Victaulic, 499 F.3d at 232, because Plaintiffs could receive a 
ruling on their preliminary injunction motion if they 
18 
 
discontinue the Texas action.  Compare Rolo, 949 F.2d at 698-
99 (action stayed pending resolution of related bankruptcy and 
criminal proceedings).  As a result, the stay is not indefinite 
because by discontinuing the Texas action, Plaintiffs “can get 
substantially similar relief,” Victaulic, 499 F.3d at 232, to what 
they seek here, namely directing the District Court to rule on 
the preliminary injunction motion, as the Court has made clear 
that it would consider the motion under that circumstance.  
Thus, they can obtain the relief that they seek “without an 
immediate appeal.”  Id.  Furthermore, an immediate appeal is 
not the only means of obtaining the relief Plaintiffs seek 
(enjoining the Attorney General’s enforcement efforts) 
because Defense Distributed and SAF are pursuing that same 
relief in Texas.  The effective-challenge prong serves an 
important purpose in ensuring that only appeals that are 
necessary are allowed.  See Gardner, 437 U.S. at 480.  Because 
appellate review here and now is not the only remedy available 




 For the foregoing reasons, we will dismiss the appeal. 
 
 
PHIPPS, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
In dismissing these appeals for lack of jurisdiction, the 
Majority Opinion misapplies well-established standards for 
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).  This 
consolidated case involves appeals of two orders – one that had 
the practical effect of refusing a motion for a preliminary 
injunction, the other that expressly dismissed that motion.  
Precedent permits appellate review of orders with the practical 
effect of denying a motion for a preliminary injunction.  And 
the text of § 1292(a)(1) allows interlocutory appeals of orders 
refusing such motions.  Yet the Majority Opinion rejects 
appellate jurisdiction over appeals from both orders.  By so 
doing, District Court’s underlying basis for those orders – its 
application of the first-filed rule – will never be subject to 
meaningful appellate review.  I see it differently, and I 




Under § 1292(a)(1), appellate jurisdiction extends to 
interlocutory orders that grant or deny injunctive relief: 
 
The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of 
appeals from interlocutory orders of the district 
courts of the United States . . . granting . . . [or] 
refusing . . . injunctions. 
 
28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (alterations omitted). 
 
Beyond orders that expressly grant or refuse injunctive 
relief are those orders that have the practical effect of refusing 




Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 3924.1 (3d ed. Apr. 2020 update) 
(“Refusal of an explicit request for a preliminary injunction 
need not be express[;] [a] variety of actions or even inaction 
may have the same effect as an express refusal, supporting 
appeal.”).  Under the test announced in Carson v. American 
Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79 (1981), orders with the practical 
effect of denying preliminary injunctive relief may be appealed 
under § 1292(a)(1) when three conditions are met: 
 
1. The order has the practical effect of 
refusing an injunction; 
 
2. The denial of immediate appellate review 
exposes a party to the risk of serious or 
irreparable harm; and 
 
3. The denial of immediate appellate review 
causes a party to lose its opportunity to 
effectually challenge the interlocutory 
order.   
 
See id. at 83-84; see also Rolo v. Gen. Dev. Corp., 949 F.2d 
695, 702-03 (3d Cir. 1991); 11A Wright & Miller § 2962 (3d 
ed. Apr. 2020 updated) (“[A] district court may not avoid 
immediate review of its determination simply by failing to 
characterize or label its decision as one denying . . . injunctive 
relief.” (emphasis added)). 
 
I believe that both bases for interlocutory appeal – 
practical effect and express refusal – are available here.  The 
District Court’s first order, which stayed the case pending 
resolution of a suit in Texas (brought by only two of the seven 




appellants’ motion for a preliminary injunction.  And the 
second order, which dismissed appellants’ motion for 
preliminary injunction without prejudice, had the actual effect 
of refusing their request for emergency relief.   
 
II. 
Unlike the Majority, I believe that the first order 
appealed – the March 7 stay order (Stay Order) – satisfies the 




Under the first Carson element, the Stay Order had the 
“practical effect of refusing an injunction.”  Carson, 450 U.S. 
at 84; see also Rolo, 949 F.2d at 702.  As explained by the 
Supreme Court, “[t]h[e] ‘practical effect’ rule serves a valuable 
purpose[:]  If an interlocutory injunction is improperly granted 
or denied, much harm can occur before the final decision in the 
district court.”  Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2319 (2018).  
And before today, Circuit precedent recognized that a stay for 
an indeterminate period with a motion for injunctive relief 
pending sufficed as a basis for appellate jurisdiction because 
that stay “effectively denied [the movants] the ultimate relief 
that they seek.”  Rolo, 949 F.2d at 703 & n.5; see also Vitaulic 
Co. v. Tieman, 499 F.3d 227, 232 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[T]his is an 
appeal from the (implicit) denial of the preliminary injunction, 
which, we have held, is the primary purpose of § 1292(a)(1).”).  




a case with a pending motion for a preliminary injunction.  That 
has the practical effect of denying that motion. 
 
In avoiding that outcome, the Majority Opinion 
overextends dictum from Cohen v. Bd. of Trs., 867 F.2d 1455 
(3d Cir. 1989) (en banc).  See Maj. Op. at 9-12.  That decision 
announced that “an order staying or refusing to stay an action 
for equitable relief does not fall under § 1292(a)(1), even 
though it postpones or accelerates resolution of an action 
seeking injunctive relief.”  Cohen, 867 F.2d at 1464 (emphasis 
added).  But “an action for equitable relief” is not equivalent to 
‘a motion for a preliminary injunction,’ as is present here.  
Indeed, this Court later clarified that staying such motions has 
the practical effect of denying preliminary injunctive relief 
under § 1292(a)(1): a “district court’s refusal to entertain [a] 
motion [for injunctive relief by imposing an indeterminate 
stay] had precisely the same effect on the [movants] as would 
an order expressly denying that motion.”  Rolo, 949 F.2d at 703 
n.5. 
 
Nor does the Stay Order relate “only to the conduct or 
progress of litigation before that court.”  Gulfstream Aerospace 
Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 279 (1988) 
(emphasis added).  It is not, for example, an order setting a 
briefing or a discovery schedule.  See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 
16(b) (scheduling orders); id. 37 (discovery orders).  Rather, it 
is an indefinite stay that postpones the resolution of a pending 




The second Carson requirement is also satisfied here 




irreparable, consequence.”  Carson, 450 U.S. at 84.  The seven 
appellants moved for a preliminary injunction, in part, to enjoin 
the deprivation of their First Amendment right to free speech.  
App. 94-143.  And a deprivation of a First Amendment right 
creates a presumption of irreparable injury.  See Neb. Press 
Ass’n v. Stuart, 423 U.S. 1327, 1329 (1975) (“[A]ny First 
Amendment infringement that occurs with each passing day is 
irreparable.”).1  I do not believe that presumption has been 
rebutted. 
 
 The Majority Opinion finds no irreparable injury here, 
however.  It relies on the fact that appellants “could have 
withdrawn their action in Texas and pursued the New Jersey 
action.”  Maj. Op. at 15.  But that explanation is at best 
incomplete as only two of the seven appellants sued in Texas.  
And even for those two common parties, the Majority Opinion 
places undue weight on the absence of a motion for a 
preliminary injunction in Texas – after all, that court 
determined that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the 
Attorney General of New Jersey.  See Maj. Op. at 15 
(“Plaintiffs’ litigation strategy . . . belies an assertion of 
irreparable harm.”).  It is quite something to conclude that a 
party’s First Amendment injury is not serious because that 
party – although moving for a preliminary injunction – did not 
 
1 See also Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) 
(Brennan, J.,  plurality) (“The loss of First Amendment 
freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably 
constitutes irreparable injury.”); 11A  Wright & Miller 
§ 2948.1 (3d ed. Apr. 2020 update) (“When an alleged 
deprivation of a constitutional right is involved, such as the 
right to free speech or freedom of religion, most courts hold 




move for a preliminary injunction in a separate case that was 
dismissed on personal jurisdiction grounds.  See Victaulic, 
499 F.3d at 232 (“[W]hether the appellant[s] moved for a 
preliminary injunction is evidence of the case’s urgency.”). 
 
 The Majority Opinion also dismisses the possibility of 
irreparable injury by reference to a nationwide injunction 
issued by a District Judge in the Western District of 
Washington.  See Maj. Op. at 15-16 (citing Washington v. U.S. 
Dep’t of State, -- F. Supp. 3d --, 2020 WL 1083720, at *11 
(W.D. Wash. Mar. 6, 2020)).  That injunction – issued by a 
court with territorial jurisdiction over six counties2 – enjoins a 
final rule that would provide authorization under a statute, 
22 U.S.C. § 2778(h), for some of the speech that the seven 
appellants seek to engage in.  But here appellants seek to 
vindicate constitutional rights.  Thus, even supposing both 
statutory and regulatory prohibitions on appellants’ proposed 
speech, those alone do not extinguish appellants’ First 
Amendment rights.   
 
For these reasons, I believe that the presumption of 
serious, perhaps irreparable injury remains unrebutted here. 
 
 
2 The Seattle Division of the United States Court for Western 
District of Washington has jurisdiction over the following six 
counties:  Island, King, San Juan, Skagit, Snohomish, and 
Whatcom.  See United States District Court Western District 
of Washington, About the Court, 
https://www.wawd.uscourts.gov/about (last visited Aug. 10, 






 The third Carson element is likewise satisfied because 
the Stay Order can be “effectually challenged” only by 
immediate appeal.  Carson, 450 U.S. at 84.  This third 
consideration focuses on “whether the appellant[s] can get 
substantially similar relief without an immediate appeal.”  
Victaulic, 499 F.3d at 232.  But no such possibility exists for 
the Stay Order.   
 
It is not an answer that by the terms of the Stay Order 
appellants can choose for themselves to proceed in New Jersey 
by dropping the Texas litigation.  See Maj. Op. at 17-18 (“An 
appeal is not the only means of effectively challenging the 
orders, because Plaintiffs could receive a ruling on their 
preliminary injunction motion if they discontinue the Texas 
action.” (internal quotation marks, alterations, and citation 
omitted)).  Five appellants are not parties to the Texas case, and 
they have no such choice.  But even if the remaining two 
appellants dismissed the Texas suit, that would not allow for a 
challenge to the Stay Order – by its own terms, the order would 
have expired then.  In the meantime, the damage from the delay 
would have already been done without a meaningful 
opportunity for appellate review.  See Goldberg v. 401 N. 
Wabash Venture LLC, 755 F.3d 456, 464 (7th Cir. 2014) (“The 
past cannot be recreated.  Time runs in only one direction – and 
it’s forward, not backward.”).  Thus, regardless of the choice 
available to two of the seven appellants, under today’s ruling, 
the possibility of meaningful appellate review of the Stay 
Order is not merely postponed; it is eliminated.   
 
It is true, as the Majority observes, that the Stay Order 




appellants seek.  But in my view such cold consolation – 
especially for the five appellants who are not parties to the 
Texas litigation and whose remedy, in the words of the District 
Court, is “to be patient,” App. 1006 – does not suffice to satisfy 
the third Carson element.  Instead of hinging on the continued 
availability of ultimate relief, that third consideration depends 
on the ability to meaningfully challenge the order that currently 
denies preliminary injunctive relief.  See Carson, 450 U.S. at 
86 (“In the instant case, unless the District Court order denying 
the motion to enter the consent decree is immediately 
appealable, petitioners will lose their opportunity to 
‘effectually challenge’ an interlocutory order that denies them 
injunctive relief.”); see also Neb. Press, 423 U.S. at 1329 
(“[E]ach passing day may constitute a separate and cognizable 
infringement of the First Amendment.”).  Appellants here lack 




The appeal of the District Court’s second order 
(Dismissal Order) provides a separate and independent basis 
for appellate review under § 1292(a)(1).  That order from 
August 29, 2019, “dismissed without prejudice” appellant’s 
preliminary injunction motion and administratively closed the 
case.  By doing so, the Dismissal Order unequivocally refused 
to grant appellants’ request for interim injunctive relief.  Due 
to that actual and express refusal to grant the preliminary 
injunction, there is no need to conduct the Carson ‘practical 




refusal to grant an injunction, and it therefore qualifies for 
appellate review under the plain text of § 1292(a)(1).   
 
The Majority Opinion attempts to minimize that reality 
by noting that the dismissal was ‘without prejudice.’  See Maj. 
Op. at 10-12.  But for a denial of a preliminary injunction, such 
a qualifier is immaterial for purposes of appellate review under 
§ 1292(a)(1).  Whether the dismissal of the motion is with or 
without prejudice, appellants have most certainly not received 
the preliminary injunctive relief they requested.  See Hoots v. 
Pennsylvania, 639 F.2d 972, 979 (3d Cir. 1981) (“Although the 
trial court denied the motion for an injunction ‘without 
prejudice,’ the effect of the denial was to preclude any 
possibility of granting the relief sought by appellants.” 
(emphasis added)).3  
 
The Majority Opinion also looks beyond the text of the 
Dismissal Order to discredit the dismissal.  See Maj. Op. at 10 
(“The District Court’s order ‘dismissing’ the motion for a 
preliminary injunction also does not qualify as a denial of an 
injunction[,] [because] [w]hile the Court used the word 
‘dismiss,’ a fair reading of the order and the record indicates 
that the Court was simply removing from its docket a motion 
that would not be acted upon soon.” (alteration and citation 
 
3 See also Gen. Elec. Co. v. Marvel Rare Metals Co., 287 U.S. 
430, 432 (1932) (order dismissing counterclaim seeking 
permanent and preliminary injunctive relief was considered an 
appealable interlocutory order); Valenti v. Mitchell, 962 F.2d 
288, 295 (3d Cir. 1992) (“When a claim seeking injunctive 
relief is dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, it has the effect of 
denying the ultimate equitable relief sought by the claimant, 




omitted)).  But there is no reason to look beyond the text of an 
unambiguous court order.  Put differently, when the plain 
language of a court order expressly denies injunctive relief, the 
text controls, and Carson imposes no additional requirements.  
See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Walsh, 618 F.3d 
218, 224 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Carson does not impose additional 
.  .  . requirement[s] for appellate jurisdiction over orders that 
explicitly . . . refuse . . . injunctions and thereby meet the plain 
terms of the statute.”).  
 
* * * 
 
For these reasons, I disagree with the Majority 
Opinion’s assessment that “there has been no ruling, explicitly 
or effectively, denying the injunction.”  Maj. Op. at 12.  Both 
orders did so.  Accordingly, I would find that we have appellate 
jurisdiction to evaluate both orders under § 1292(a)(1).  
